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Abstract
Whether an action is morally right depends upon the alternative acts available to the agent. Actualists hold that what an 
agent would actually do determines her moral obligations. Possibilists hold that what an agent could possibly do determines 
her moral obligations. Both views face compelling criticisms. Despite the fact that actualist and possibilist assumptions are 
at the heart of seminal arguments in business ethics, there has been no explicit discussion of actualism and possibilism in 
the business ethics literature. This paper has two primary goals. First, it aims to rectify this omission by bringing to light 
the importance of the actualism/possibilism debate for business ethics through questions about the ethics of sweatshops. 
Second, it aims to make some progress in the sweatshop debate by examining and defending an alternative view, hybridism, 
and describing the moral and practical implications of hybridism for the sweatshop debate.
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Introduction
There is a consensus in normative ethics that the deontic 
status of an act depends upon the alternative acts available to 
the agent. Yet, there is a lack of consensus about which acts 
count as the relevant alternative acts available to an agent. 
It turns out that this is a surprisingly difficult question to 
answer, yet it’s one on which any complete normative ethi-
cal theory must take a stance. It’s also a question on which 
a number of issues in business ethics hinges. This issue can 
best be illustrated with a first-order case.
Entrepreneurial Eddie: Eddie the entrepreneur is 
opening a t-shirt factory today and now faces the fol-
lowing choice about what to pay his employees. He can 
pay them a low wage or he can pay them a high (i.e. 
living) wage. Suppose that the best thing Eddie can do 
over time is <pay his employees a high wage and keep 
the factory open as long as it’s profitable>. However, 
because Eddie doesn’t like sacrificing profit, he would 
freely decide to <close his factory after 6 months> if 
he first <pays his employees a high wage>. He would 
do this out of frustration in spite of the fact that the 
factory would be profitable.1 This would be the worst 
outcome.2 Alternatively, Eddie could <pay his employ-
ees a low wage and keep the factory open as long as 
it’s profitable>, which we can suppose is better than 
the worst outcome, yet worse than the best outcome. 
Finally, let’s suppose that Eddie would freely decide 
to <keep his factory open as long as it is profitable> if 
today he decides to <pay his employees a low wage>.3
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1 For the purposes of the debate, it doesn’t matter why Eddie would 
close the factory after 6 months so long as he could keep it open. To 
keep things simple, we’ve just stipulated that he does it because he 
doesn’t want to sacrifice profit. But the example could be amended 
to have him close it in response to market forces, acquiring different 
entrepreneurial interests, fatigue or anything else.
2 There may be a variety of reasons that it’s worse for people to 
receive a high pay for 6 months and then become unemployed than 
to not receive the job in the first place. Let’s suppose that being tem-
porarily lifted out of extreme poverty would result in them incurring 
other financial commitments they’ll be unable to meet once they’re 
unemployed again, and that this will leave them worse off than before.
3 This case is structurally similar to an example proposed by Gold-
man (now Holly Smith) (1978, pp. 185–186). Variations of this 
example appear throughout the literature, including in Jackson and 
Pargetter (1986, p. 235), Carlson (1995, p. 124), Vorobej (2000, 
pp. 131–132), Portmore (2011, p. 180; 2019, chap. 5), Timmerman 
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To be sure, Eddie can choose to pay his employees a high 
wage when the factory opens and, 6 months down the road, 
he can choose to keep his factory open as long as it is profit-
able. The problem is simply that Eddie would freely choose 
to <close the factory after 6 months> if he today chooses 
to <pay his employees a high wage> . Furthermore, we can 
suppose that Eddie would make this choice no matter what 
his intentions are today.
Here is the tricky ethical question. In light of these 
facts, is Eddie obligated to pay his employees a high wage? 
Roughly, actualists hold that Eddie is obligated to pay his 
employees a low wage because what would actually hap-
pen if he pays them a low wage is better than what would 
actually happen if he pays them a high wage. Possibilists, 
however, hold that Eddie is obligated to pay his employees 
a high wage because doing that is part of the best series 
of acts that it’s possible for Eddie to perform, viz. pay his 
employees a high wage and keep the factory open as long 
as it’s profitable. Both actualism and possibilism have some 
intuitive appeal, yet (as will be illustrated shortly) both are 
subject to seemingly quite compelling objections.4
Here’s the rub for business ethics. One can find, and con-
struct, structurally analogous cases for any applied business 
ethics question.5 Surprisingly, however, there has been no 
explicit discussion of actualism and possibilism in the busi-
ness ethics literature, though numerous papers contain argu-
ments that either inadvertently commit their authors to one 
of these views, or at least strongly suggest that they are dis-
posed to accept one of these views. The purpose of this paper 
is twofold. First, it aims to rectify this omission in the lit-
erature by bringing to light the importance of the actualism/
possibilism debate for business ethics. It will primarily do so 
by examining the debate through questions about the ethics 
of sweatshops. Second, it aims to make some progress in 
the sweatshop debate by (i) illustrating how both actualist 
and possibilist assumptions underlie existing arguments in 
the sweatshop literature and by (ii) defending an alterna-
tive view to actualism and possibilism, viz. hybridism. This 
alternative view has direct moral and practical import for 
the ethics of sweatshops. If hybridism is correct, it provides 
reason to think that it’s almost always morally wrong for 
individuals (and companies) to create sweatshops, though 
they may nevertheless, under certain specific conditions, 
have most moral practical reason to create them. This is a 
view that has not yet been defended in the literature.6
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, 
we provide a more detailed overview of actualism and pos-
sibilism, and review the most salient ethical implications 
for the sweatshop debate. In the third section, we provide 
a brief overview of the literature on sweatshops, showing 
that actualist and possibilist assumptions underlie (or are at 
least suggested by) some arguments made in the literature 
and demonstrate that there is no way to fully resolve the 
sweatshop debate without first taking a stance on the actual-
ism/possibilism debate. After that, we argue that neither a 
purely actualist nor a purely possibilist view on the ethics of 
sweatshops is viable. In the space we have left, we provide 
a prima facie defense of our favored hybridist position and, 
in doing so, discuss the implications of our view for the 
sweatshop debate.
Actualism, Possibilism, and Sweatshops
Now that we have provided a basic overview of the actual-
ism/possibilism debate, we are in a position to examine each 
position in more detail and explain their implications for the 
sweatshop debate. We’ll start with actualism.
Actualism
Should Eddie pay his employees a low or high wage? Since 
we’ve already provided a cursory explanation of the two 
4 As is standard in the literature, we formulate actualism and possi-
bilism in terms of one’s objective, rather than one’s subjective, obli-
gations. Roughly, an objective obligation is what an agent should do 
if she were aware of all of the normatively relevant facts. Subjective 
obligations, by contrast, are determined by the agent’s epistemic state 
(such as her beliefs, or beliefs that would be supported by her evi-
dence) concerning the normatively relevant facts (cf. Portmore 2011, 
pp. 12–23; Zimmerman 1996, pp. 10–20). To keep the dialectic as 
simple as possible, unless we state otherwise, we’ll assume that the 
agents in the cases we give know all of the normatively relevant facts. 
This means that the agent’s subjective and objective obligations are 
identical in such cases. But nothing important, for the purposes of 
our argument, hangs on this assumption. Since agents never have full 
knowledge of how they would act in various counterfactual situations, 
the real life application of these views requires agents to act in light 
of the best evidence they have about how they would freely act in 
such situations.
5 This includes, for instance, questions about manipulative advertis-
ing practices (Holley 1998; Arrington 1982), payday loans (Mayer 
2003; Stegman 2007), stakeholder theory (Zakhem 2008), and CEO 
pay (Moriarty 2009).
6 The actualism/possibilism debate concerns the relationship between 
agents’ free actions and their moral obligations at either the group or 
the individual level. For the sake of simplicity, our discussion will 
focus on the debate at the level of individual obligations. So, we’ll 
proceed as if individual agents, rather than group agents, are respon-
sible for the creation and conditions of sweatshops. However, nothing 
important for the purposes of our argument hangs on our describing 
the problems in these terms. Everything we write about individual 
obligations applies, mutatis mutandis, at the level of group obliga-
tions as well.
(2015, p. 1512), Timmerman and Cohen (2016, pp. 673–674), and 
Cariani (2016, p. 400).
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primary views in the literature, we are now in a position to 
examine each of them more closely. Let’s start with actual-
ism, which may be defined more precisely as follows.
Actualism: At t an agent S morally ought to φ at t’ 
iff φ-ing at t’ is an act-set currently under S’s control 
at t, and what would happen if S were to φ at t’ is 
better7 than what would happen if S were to perform 
any incompatible maximally specific act-set8 under S’s 
control at t.9
In other words, actualists hold that at any given time one 
should perform the most precise act-set under their control 
at that time that, if performed, would result in the best out-
come. In the case of Eddie, then, the actualist holds that 
he should <pay his employees a low wage> because, given 
what is under his control today, paying his employees a low 
wage is the act that would result in the best outcome. At the 
time the factory opens, the actualist does not even regard 
<paying the employees a high wage and keeping the factory 
open> as a relevant option for Eddie, even though they grant 
that this is something he can do.10 So, for all intents and 
purposes, actualists treat their future selves as completely 
distinct agents whenever the agent’s future self in not under 
the agent’s present control.
If true, actualism would seem to have important, and 
rather drastic, implications for the ethics of sweatshops. 
Most notably, it would vindicate the creation of sweatshops 
in certain cases when the alternative would make poten-
tial workers even worse off (e.g. when they would not be 
employed at all). This is interesting because it stands in stark 
contrast to the perceived wisdom in the early literature on 
the ethics of sweatshops11 and is in tension with the current 
anti—“exploitation” arguments against sweatshops.12 Nota-
bly, it also stands in contrast to the so-called Reasonable 
View in the literature, which holds that it’s permissible for 
consumers to purchase goods from sweatshops since that is 
the most they can do to benefit the workers, but impermis-
sible for employers to create sweatshops because they could 
pay their workers a high wage.13 If actualism is true, then 
the actions of both sweatshop employers and consumers of 
sweatshop goods may be vindicated. This is also interest-
ing because, while not exactly identical, it is in line with 
a number of arguments in the literature that justify sweat-
shops that are the product of consensual, mutually beneficial 
transactions.14 If true, actualism would be welcome news for 
those who wish to defend the permissibility of sweatshops 
full stop.
Possibilism
Now let’s examine possibilism in more detail, which may be 
defined precisely as follows.
Possibilism: At t an agent S is obligated to φ at t’ iff 
φ-ing at t’ is part of the best series of acts that S can 
perform from t to the last moment that S can perform 
possibly perform an act.
In other words, possibilists hold that, at any given time, 
an agent is obligated to perform the act that is part of the best 
series of acts that she can perform over the course of her life. 
Moreover, they hold that agents ought to do this irrespective 
of how they would act in the future if they performed the act 
in question. So, possibilists hold that Eddie is obligated to 
<pay his employees a high wage> in virtue of his supposed 
7 To avoid assuming impartial consequentialism, this sense of better 
may be understood to be tracking deontic value instead of intrinsic 
value.
8 At t, a maximally specific act-set that an agent can perform is one 
that extends from t to the last moment of time at which the agent can 
perform an act.
9 Unlike this formulation of actualism, early formulations did not 
build in a control condition. See Sobel (1976) and Jackson and Par-
getter (1986). Here is one such formulation. Actualism: At t an agent 
S is obligated to φ at t’ iff S can φ at t’ and what would happen if S 
were to φ at t’ is better than what would happen if S were to ~ φ at t’. 
These versions of actualism are subject to devastating problems. Most 
notably, they violate the principle of normative inheritance (Port-
more 2019, chap. 4) and they generate conflicting obligations without 
saying which obligation takes priority. See Cohen and Timmerman 
(2016, pp. 11–12), Kiesewetter (2015, pp. 929–934), and Portmore 
(2011, pp. 181–183). Subsequent versions of actualism built in a 
control condition to avoid this problem. See, for instance, Goldman 
(1978, p. 202), Bykvist (2002, pp. 61–64), and Jackson (2014). Given 
this definition, Douglas Portmore’s (2011) and Ross’s (2013) securit-
ist views also count as versions of actualism.
10 After all, by stipulation, Eddie can now decide to <pay his 
employees a high wage>. If he does this, then by stipulation, 6 
months down the road, he can decide to <keep the factory open as 
long as it’s profitable>. If an agent can <A> and if they can <B> if 
they first <A>, then the agent can <A & B>. So, to be clear, actual-
ists and possibilists may agree with one another about which act-sets 
agents can perform in any given case. Their disagreement concerns 
which acts, from among the acts the agent can perform, are norma-
tively relevant options for the agent.
11 See, for instance, Maitland (1996).
12 See, for instance, Arnold (2003), Arnold and Bowie (2003), Mayer 
(2007), Meyers (2004, p. 327, 2007), Snyder (2008, 2009, 2010), 
Steiner (1984), and Wertheimer (1999).
13 For discussion, see Faraci (2019).
14 Such arguments generally appeal what’s called the non-worseness 
claim, which will be discussed in the next section. Zwolinski (2008, 
p. 2007) has done the most to defend this sort of argument. See also 
Powell and Zwolinksi (2012) and Ferguson (2016). Though, it’s 
worth explicitly noting that Zwolinksi’s concern is that external mar-
ket factors will undermine the viability of the sweatshop, not that the 
owner of the sweatshop will decide to close their business because 
it’s not maximizing profits. For some criticisms of this style of argu-
ment, see Malmqvist (2017, 2013) and Barnes (2013).
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obligation to both <pay his employees a high wage and keep 
the factory open>, which they regard as a relevant option 
for Eddie.15 Possibilists, then, treat their future selves in the 
same way they treat their present selves. They regard their 
future selves as importantly distinct from other agents over 
which they also (at the present time) lack control.
As Entrepreneurial Eddie makes clear, possibilism is 
generally much more demanding of imperfect agents than 
actualism since possibilism requires agents to bring about 
the best outcome they can irrespective of the free (akratic or 
immoral) choices they would make in the future.16 If true, 
possibilism would also have important, and rather drastic, 
implications for the ethics of sweatshops. Most obviously, 
employers may be obligated to pay their workers high wages 
even at the expense of high profit margins. It would generally 
be morally wrong to create sweatshops when the employers 
could pay their workers a higher wage than they do, even if 
the workers’ wage is the product of consensual, mutually 
beneficial transactions. More generally, employers and con-
sumers may be obligated to perform beneficent acts, and not 
merely non-harmful17 ones. If possibilism is true, then the 
most popular and influential moral defenses of sweatshops 
may fail. This would be welcome news for those who wish 
to justify their intuitive judgments that sweatshop employers 
are doing something morally wrong.
In this section, we’ve reviewed actualism and possibilism 
in detail and highlighted the important implications of each 
view for the sweatshop debate. This raises the question of 
whether the ethicists who have contributed to the sweat-
shop literature are actualists, possibilists, or neither. In the 
next section, we examine what we take to be the seminal 
arguments in the contemporary literature on sweatshops and 
show how some arguments inadvertently presuppose (and 
others merely suggest) actualist assumptions, while others 
inadvertently presuppose (and others merely suggest) pos-
sibilist assumptions.18
Business Ethicists on Sweatshops
In this section, we start by providing a rather brief and gen-
eral overview of some important articles in the literature, 
while also focusing on certain crucial moves that appear 
throughout a number of articles, and which deserve special 
attention.
Arguments that are Possibilist in Spirit
Perhaps the primary question about the ethics of sweatshops 
concerns whether employers (or companies) are morally 
obligated to provide wages above what local market con-
ditions and employment transactions dictate. Or, as we’ve 
simplistically put the question up until now, should employ-
ers pay their employees a “high” wage? Those who have 
answered in the affirmative generally provided the following 
sorts of reasons in favor of their view. Though sweatshop 
laborers generally voluntarily and, at times, enthusiastically 
accept and benefit from the low wages provided, these labor-
ers are nevertheless exploited when their wages fall below 
a morally acceptable minimum. Employers (and compa-
nies) arguably generally have the requisite knowledge and 
power to provide “high” wages (Arnold and Bowie 2003). 
Additionally, it is possible for companies to pay a high 
wage without making the situation morally worse. Indeed, 
higher wages can often make the situation morally better 
if continued high wages are accompanied by other sorts of 
actions. For instance, some conceive of a more just economy 
where market failures are not rewarded (Arnold and Hart-
man 2005). Others argue that it is possible for companies to 
efficiently absorb and spread out the costs of higher wages 
in various ways, such as limiting short-term profits. They 
also point out that there are good reasons to believe that 
increasing wages could, in certain conditions created by the 
owner, lead to (i) increased worker productivity, (ii) a posi-
tive marketing campaign, and (iii) ultimately increase long-
term value production (Meyers 2004).
There are a variety of arguments in the sweatshop litera-
ture that are possibilist in spirit. Many, though not all, are 
unified by the idea that sweatshop employers wrongfully 
15 Possibilists then assume a principle of deontic logic known as 
“ought distributes through conjunction.” This principle holds that if 
an agent S ought to do both A and B, then S ought to do A and S 
ought to do B. This principle is represented in the standard deontic 
logic system as follows: O(A & B) → O(A) & O(B). Versions of actu-
alism that build in a control condition are consistent with this princi-
ple, while versions of actualism that don’t are inconsistent with this 
principle.
16 There are exceptions, however. Actualism might require cer-
tain agents to make demanding sacrifices now (e.g. doing some-
thing unpleasant to develop a more altruistic character) in order to 
ensure that they do more good in the future. Possibilism, by contrast, 
wouldn’t require such sacrifices. For discussion on the demanding-
ness of actualism versus possibilism, see Timmerman (2019) and 
Timmerman and Swenson (2019).
17 Here harm should be understood to pick out the counterfactual 
comparative account of all things considered harm, which is the 
account of harm that seems to be assumed in the literature. For a dis-
cussion of this type of harm, see Timmerman (2016).
18 Some arguments are also, in a sense, underspecified and not com-
mitted to one view in the actualist/possibilist debate. However, in 
order to provide a fully robust defense of their view, they would have 
to take a stance on the debate.
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exploit their employees in a way that is morally wrong.19 
Exploitation may be thought to occur when the employer 
takes advantage of the employee by benefitting dispro-
portionately from the product they together create (Mey-
ers 2004, p. 327). This would be an instance of wrongful 
exploitation because the disproportionate benefit is suppos-
edly unfair (Snyder 2010, p. 188).20 Importantly, this exploi-
tation is thought to be unfair even in cases in which both the 
employee and employer consent to the transaction, there are 
no negative externalities, and the arrangement makes both 
the employee and employer better off. David Faraci (2019) 
nicely captures this idea when explaining how this position 
is consistent with both deontological and consequentialist 
views. He first considers a principle he refers to as D2, and 
which we’ll refer to as Unfair Distribution.
Unfair Distribution: It is impermissible to distrib-
ute gains in welfare unfairly, unless fair distribution is 
impossible or otherwise impermissible (p. 176).
Faraci holds that employers have the option of consist-
ently paying employees a high wage even though they 
wouldn’t do so if they were to start a sweatshop. On the other 
hand, in defense of the so-called Reasonable View, Faraci 
holds that it’s permissible for third parties to support sweat-
shops because they can’t ensure “that [the employee] is hired 
and compensated” with a high wage (p. 176). Of course, the 
employer can ensure as much, so Faraci holds that employers 
are obligated to ensure that that their employees are consist-
ently paid a high wage irrespective of how they would act in 
the relevant counterfactual situations.
Notice that each of these arguments focuses on what it’s 
possible for employers (and companies) to do. Each argu-
ment entails that employers are obligated to continually pay 
their employees high wages independent of what employ-
ers (and companies) would otherwise do. As such, these 
arguments appear possibilist in nature. Though none of 
these authors explicitly commit themselves to possibilism, 
they inadvertently do so by (*) assuming that it’s a relevant 
option for employers (and companies) to continually pay 
their workers a high wage, and (**) by arguing that employ-
ers are obligated to bring about this optimal outcome.
Arguments that are Actualist in Spirit
By contrast, those who have argued that companies ought 
not to raise wages above what markets dictate approach the 
question from a different angle. They seem to think that the 
central question as to what employers (and companies) ought 
to do turns on what would actually happen to sweatshop 
workers if they’re employed at a low wage compared to what 
would actually happen to them if they weren’t (Maitland 
2001). They grant that it is certainly possible for a company 
to raise wages above what the market dictates, and some 
even grant that this would be better were employers (and 
companies) to do it. At the same time, they’ll highlight the 
fact that businesses operate in a very competitive environ-
ment. Ceteris paribus, those who actually raise wages will 
be at a competitive disadvantage. If the employer does raise 
wages, they may then later decide to compensate for this 
lost profit opportunity (e.g. by significantly reducing wages, 
downsizing, or making other substantial cutbacks).21 The 
underlying thought behind these sorts of arguments seems 
to be that while it’s possible (perhaps in ideal circumstances) 
for employers to continually pay their employees a high 
wage, they’re permitted to pay them a low wage because, if 
they didn’t, the workers would be even worse off. This could 
be because the potential employees wouldn’t have jobs in the 
first place, because consumers may then favor companies 
that pay the higher wages, hurting the worse-off workers, or 
because paying them a high wage would result in some other 
worse downstream effects. These problems help illustrate 
why some believe that paying workers the low wage dictated 
by the market is morally permissible. The basic thought is 
that it’s permissible when it’s preferable to what otherwise 
would happen.22 Since each of these arguments focuses on 
the counterfactual question of how the sweatshop employ-
ees would fare were they not to be paid a low wage, such 
arguments appear actualist in nature. Though, notably, not 
every counterfactual consideration concerns the sweatshop 
owners’ future self and akrasia, and not all considerations 
fit the structure of Entrepreneurial Eddie, which is but one 
20 Snyder (2008, 2010) also considers Kantian exploitation of using 
others as a mere means. For other heavily Kantian-esque critiques, 
see Bowie (1999), Hill (2002), Herman (2007), and Radin and 
Calkins (2006). We don’t focus on Kantian critiques (or the Kantian 
aspects of the exploitation arguments) cited in this paper. Instead, our 
primary focus is on the broader, more theoretically neutral, exploita-
tion arguments against sweatshops.
21 One complication is that paying a high wage can result in a loss of 
market share and can sometimes ultimately cause the company to go 
out of business, only to be replaced by other companies that would be 
even more exploitative. This shows that questions about the ethics of 
sweatshops don’t only hinge on answers to questions about the actual-
ism/possibilism debate, but also on questions about collective action 
problems. For discussion of this issue in other contexts, see Kagan 
(2011) and Nefsky (2011) for a reply. The structural and collective 
action problems in markets can make the discretionary action of indi-
vidual agents or companies ineffective or at worst detrimental (Mayer 
2007).
22 Along similar lines, some have argued that companies may even 
be morally justified in breaking the law if doing so is more attractive 
than any other available option (Powell and Zwolinski 2012).
19 See, for instance, Arnold and Bowie (2003), Faraci (2019), Meyers 
(2004), Sample (2003), Steiner (1984), Valdman (2008, 2009), and 
Wertheimer (1999).
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example in the actualism/possibilism debate. Nevertheless, 
although none of these authors explicitly commit themselves 
to actualism, they inadvertently do so when they appeal to 
such counterfactual questions in assessing the permissibility 
of paying workers a low wage.
There are also a variety of arguments in the sweatshop 
literature that appear actualist in spirit, even if they do not 
necessarily commit the authors to actualism. Many, though 
not all, are unified by an appeal to the non-worseness claim, 
which is formulated as follows.
Non-worseness Claim: It cannot be morally worse for 
A to interact with B than it is for A not to interact with 
B when the interaction is mutually beneficial, consen-
sual, and free from negative externalities (Powell and 
Zwolinski 2012, p. 469).23
While the non-worseness claim is consistent with reject-
ing actualism, note that what is generally assumed to deter-
mine whether the interaction is beneficial is whether the 
agents in question would be better off if the transaction 
occurred than if it did not. It is this assumption, combined 
with the non-worseness claim, that makes such defenses in 
the literature appear actualist in nature. To illustrate, con-
sider a case where sweatshop employees consent to work for 
low wages and imagine that there are no negative externali-
ties that result from their employment. If, as it is assumed 
in the literature, it’s permissible for potential sweatshop 
employers to not hire the sweatshop employees in the first 
place and if, as it is assumed in the literature, sweatshop 
employees freely chose to work and are better off working 
than they would otherwise be,24 the non-worseness claim 
entails that employers and employees are both acting per-
missibly. This is but one of many examples that can be con-
structed to illustrate the same point.
What’s interesting is that pro-sweatshop arguments that 
appeal to the non-worseness claim are thought to provide a 
theory neutral defense of sweatshops (Faraci 2019). In one 
sense, this is true. After all, such arguments are consist-
ent with various versions of deontology, consequentialism, 
contractualism, and virtue ethics. In another sense, however, 
they aren’t theory neutral because they appear to be actual-
ist in nature. Though none of these authors explicitly com-
mit themselves to actualism, they inadvertently do so once 
they assume that the permissibility of creating sweatshops 
depends, in part, on how well of sweatshop employees would 
otherwise fare.
To be clear, possibilists and actualists can agree that 
<paying employees a high wage and keeping the factory 
open as long as it is profitable> is the optimal situation, 
though not everyone even agrees about this. Since compa-
nies and their respective management teams can continually 
pay their employees a high wage, possibilists conclude that 
they are obligated to do so, so long as this is what would 
bring about the best outcome. This seems to have a certain 
degree of intuitive appeal and, as we’ve seen, many business 
ethicists seem to be in this camp. Although receiving a high 
wage is theoretically optimal, given how well sweatshop 
employees would otherwise fare, actualists conclude that 
companies (or employers) are not obligated to provide such 
a wage. Indeed, they shouldn’t if it will only make employ-
ees worse off in the long run. Both actualist and possibilist 
positions seem to have a degree of intuitive appeal. As we 
will argue in the next section, however, there is good reason 
to believe that both actualist and possibilist views are false.
Where Actualist and Possibilist Arguments 
Go Wrong
What seems paradoxical about the actualism and possibilism 
debate is that both of these mutually exclusive views seem 
to be getting at something important and true. Moreover, as 
we will argue shortly, both views also seem to be commit-
ted to deeply implausible claims. In this section we reveal 
the implausible commitments of each position, both gener-
ally and specifically with respect to the sweatshop debate.25 
Then, in the final section, we use the lessons to be gleamed 
from actualism’s and possibilism’s shortcomings to motivate 
an alternative view, viz.—hybridism, and explore its impli-
cations for the sweatshop debate.
What’s Wrong with Possibilism?
Possibilism is subject to one particularly difficult objection. 
Since facts about how agents would freely act in the future 
plays no role in determining possibilism’s verdicts, it gener-
ates action-guiding obligations that, if acted on, would result 
in the worst possible outcome. We can state the objection 
more precisely as follows.
The Worst Outcome Objection: Possibilism entails 
that an agent S can have an action-guiding obligation 
to φ even when φ-ing entails that S would perform an 
23 See also Barnes (2013, p. 159), Faraci (2019, p. 2), Snyder 
(2009), Zwolinski’s (2007, pp. 708–710; 2008, pp. 357–360), and 
Wertheimer (1999, pp. 289–293).
24 For arguments that sweatshop workers do not receive a net benefit 
from their employment, or did not freely choose to be employed, see 
Arnold (2001), Kates (2015), and Miller (2003).
25 For a very detailed overview of all of the important objections 
to actualism and possibilism, ones that go beyond the scope of this 
paper, see Timmerman and Cohen (2019, Sects. 2.5, 3.4, and 3.5).
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act-set that is deeply morally wrong and that is worse 
than the act-set S would perform if S were to ~ φ.26
This consequence is especially unpalatable in cases where 
the difference is goodness between the best and second best 
outcome is slight, yet the difference between the second best 
and worst outcome is large. For instance, consider a varia-
tion of Entrepreneurial Eddie, where the potential employ-
ees are in especially dire straits and whose only hope of 
being lifted out of extreme poverty is to find steady employ-
ment. As before, if Eddie were to <pay his employees a high 
wage> , he would <close the factory after 6 months> failing 
to lift anyone out of extreme poverty. However, now let’s 
suppose that if Eddie were to <pay his employees a very 
near high wage27>, he would <keep the factory open as long 
as it’s profitable>, which we can assume will permanently 
lift everyone out of poverty, significantly improving their 
lives. Possibilism entails that Eddie should now choose to 
pay his employees the ever so slightly higher wage even 
though, no matter what else he intends to do now, this would 
result in complete disaster for all of his employees. Possi-
bilism entails this even though Eddie could now choose to 
pay his employees something very near a high wage, which 
would result in a near optimal outcome for everyone.
The problem gets worse if it is additionally assumed (as 
it often is in possibilist exploitation arguments)28 that it’s 
permissible for the employee to not hire anyone in the first 
place. If possibilism is true, Eddie could reason as follows. 
“If I open a factory, I’ll do something wrong (i.e. pay people 
just below the morally acceptable salary). If I don’t open a 
factory, I won’t do anything wrong. I don’t want to do any-
thing wrong, so I won’t open a factory.” But now everyone 
is worse off as a result, so something seems to have gone 
wrong.29 How could morality prohibit an action that is bet-
ter for everyone and worse for no one, while permitting an 
alternative action that is worse for everyone and better for 
no one? This consideration has lead Arneson (2013) and 
McMahan (2018) to hold that it must be acceptable for Eddie 
to pay his employees less than a high wage. Others, such as 
Pummer (2019), have tried to avoid this problem by endors-
ing something roughly in the vein of hybridism, which will 
be discussed in Sect. 4.3. Everyone, however, should want 
to avoid the possibilist conclusion that Eddie has an action-
guiding moral obligation to act in a way that will bring about 
the worst possible outcome.
What’s Wrong with Actualism?
Actualism’s verdicts are determined, in part, by how agents 
would freely act in the future, and so they avoid the Worst 
Outcome Objection. However, actualism is subject to two 
distinct, comparably troubling, objections. First, and most 
straightforwardly, actualism allows agents to avoid incur-
ring obligations when they’re disposed to behave badly. But 
agents shouldn’t get out of having to do good things because 
they’re disposed to do bad things. This objection may be 
formulated more precisely as follows.
The Not Demanding Enough Objection: Actualism 
permits an agent S to avoid incurring any moral obli-
gation to φ, which S can easily fulfill, in virtue of S’s 
rotten moral character.30
This consequence is especially unpalatable in cases where 
the difference is goodness between the best and second best 
outcome is very large, yet the difference between the second 
best and worst outcome is very small. To illustrate, consider 
another variation of Entrepreneurial Eddie. This time Eddie 
has the opportunity to vastly improve working conditions 
in ways that would save many lives at the expense of los-
ing mere pennies in profit a month. However, were Eddie 
to agree to this opportunity, let’s suppose he would later 
become angry at the thought of losing profit and cancel the 
changes just before they take place. This would be worse 
than turning down the changes from the get-go because 
Eddie would get his employee’s hopes up if he first agrees 
to the changes, and then prevents them from taking place. 
According to actualism, Eddie avoids incurring an obliga-
tion to improve working conditions simply because he is 
disposed to later prevent those very changes. But this seems 
to be an implausible result. Agents’ dispositions to do wrong 
shouldn’t allow them to avoid incurring obligations to do 
good.
Not only does actualism allow agents to avoid incurring 
obligations to do good, but it can also sanction bad behavior, 
requiring agents to perform seemingly terrible acts. We can 
formulate this objection more precisely as follows.
The Bad Behavior Objection: Actualism prescribes 
bad behavior, and acting on such prescriptions pre-
30 This objection is raised in Jackson and Pargetter (1986, p. 240), 
Zimmerman (2006, p. 156), Portmore (2011, p. 207), Baker (2012, 
pp. 642–3), and Timmerman (2015, pp. 1512–1513).
26 This objection is raised in Goldman (1976, pp. 469–70), Woodard 
(2009, pp. 219–220), Portmore (2011, p. 211), and Timmerman and 
Cohen (2016, p. 674).
27 Take whatever the minimally morally acceptable wage is and sup-
pose that its one cent less than that. If the boundaries for a morally 
acceptable wage are vague, then suppose it is one cent less than the 
smallest wage that is indeterminately neither acceptable nor unaccep-
table.
28 Every paper we’ve cited that discusses the non-worseness claims 
make this assumption.
29 For further discussion of this problem, see Horton (2017, 2019), 
McMahan (2018), and Pummer (2019).
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sumably renders31 an agent S immune from moral 
criticism, even when S can easily refrain from such 
behavior.32
To see why actualism has this implication, imagine 
a rather graphic variation of the Entrepreneurial Eddie 
example. Suppose that Eddie is prone to fits of rage when 
he thinks his employees aren’t working hard enough. If 
Eddie murders an employee in a fit of rage tonight, he’ll 
calm his nerves and murder no one tomorrow. However, 
if he bypasses the chance to murder anyone tonight, he’ll 
decide to murder two of his employees tomorrow.33 Actu-
alism entails that Eddie is obligated to murder one of his 
employees tonight, which clearly seems to be the wrong 
result. Notice that actualism has this implication even though 
Eddie can refrain from murdering anyone by first choosing 
to refrain from committing murder tonight and, once tomor-
row rolls around, again choosing to refrain from committing 
murder.
It’s worth noting that Powell and Zwolinski (2012) con-
sider a similar sort of case when they consider objections to 
their (actualist-esque) defense of sweatshops. They imag-
ine someone in a boat offering to rescue another drowning 
person for the sum of $10,000 (p. 466). If the person in the 
boat would otherwise let the person drown, as is assumed 
in Powell and Zwolinski’s example, actualism entails that 
they are obligated to extort $10,000 from the drowning per-
son. Interestingly, Powell and Zwolinski wish to avoid this 
conclusion and hold that the rescuer is obligated to save 
the drowning person because, in demanding $10,000 for a 
simple rescue mission, they’re “taking wrongful advantage” 
of their monopoly on the means of rescue and not treat-
ing the person needing to be rescued with the respect they 
deserve (p. 466). This possibilist (and seemingly Kantian-
esque) response on their part seems to be in tension with 
the arguments they made about sweatshops that appear 
actualist in nature. Moreover, their attempt at identifying 
a morally relevant difference between the rescue case and 
potentially analogous sweatshop cases is unconvincing (pp. 
466–467). Sweatshop owners may also take advantage of 
their monopoly on the means of “rescue” (i.e. employment) 
and consequently exhort workers by paying them the bare 
minimum they can.
Fortunately, looks can be deceiving, and there needn’t 
even be a tension in their arguments, or so we’ll now 
suggest. Our criticisms notwithstanding, we understand 
Powell and Zwolinksi’s desire to appeal to both actualism 
and possibilism in their arguments. Though, as formulated, 
these views are mutually exclusive, yet they both seem to be 
getting at an important truth. This is why the debate seems 
so paradoxical. Though, as we demonstrated in this section, 
each view seems to have implausible commitments as well. 
This appears to be bad news for the actualist and possibilist 
arguments in the literature. We believe each of these posi-
tions should be rejected. However, there may yet be hope 
for something like those positions. In the next section, we 
articulate and provide a prima facie defense of a form of 
hybridism, one which captures what seems compelling about 
both actualism and possibilism, yet which aims to avoid the 
implausible commitments of each.
A Hybridist Approach to the Ethics 
of Sweatshops
To correctly diagnose the problems with actualism and 
possibilism, we should start by recognizing that each view 
posits a single ought, and each of these oughts leads to seem-
ingly unpalatable consequences in various actualist/possibil-
ist (sweatshop) cases. In order to avoid these problems, then, 
a view will either need to posit a single ought that generates 
the correct verdicts in all actualist/possibilist cases or posit 
multiple oughts that together can generate the correct ver-
dicts in actualist/possibilist cases. We are uncertain about 
the viability of the first option. Yet we are optimistic about 
the viability of the second option. In what follows, we defend 
our favored version of hybridism, referred to as single obli-
gation hybridism, which posits two distinct moral “oughts,” 
one actualist in nature and one possibilist in nature.34 Given 
the space available in this article, we do not aim to provide 
a decisive argument in favor of single obligation hybridism. 
Rather, our goal is to provide a defeasible argument for our 
favored view by illustrating how it can avoid the problems 
identified for actualism and possibilism. In doing so, we will 
also clarify its implications for the sweatshop debate, and 
rebut the most salient objections.
According to single obligation hybridism there are two 
moral oughts; one is the ought of moral obligation and the 
other is a practical moral ought, one that tells agents what 
to do in light of their moral shortcomings. Acting in accord-
ance with this practical moral ought will minimize the num-
ber of wrong actions agents freely perform over the course of 
their life. These oughts will only diverge in cases in which an 
imperfect moral agent is disposed to perform a wrong action 
31 This is not strictly entailed by actualism, but it is entailed by actu-
alism coupled with widely accepted axioms about moral blamewor-
thiness. For more on this, see Timmerman and Swenson (2019).
32 This objection is raised in the literature by Ross (2013), Timmer-
man and Cohen (2016), and Zimmerman (2017, p. 121).
33 This case is structurally identical to the Bobby Knight example 
given in Norcross (2005, pp. 65–168).
34 For ease of exposition, we will use the term hybridism to refer spe-
cifically to single obligation hybridism throughout the paper.
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in more than one counterfactual situation. To be sure, both 
oughts are moral oughts. It’s just that one moral ought tracks 
moral obligation, while the other tracks how imperfect moral 
agents should act in order to minimize the amount of wrong 
actions they freely perform.35
Again, we cannot provide a complete defense of hybrid-
ism in this section, though we can provide the core of our 
defense in the space we have.36 Our more important goal 
in this section is to explore hybridism’s implications for 
questions about the ethics of sweatshops. Stated briefly, 
hybridism provides reason to accept that certain exploitation 
arguments correctly identify owner’s moral obligations with 
respect to sweatshops, but it also allows that such employers 
may have most practical moral reason to open sweatshops. 
In line with the so-called Reasonable View, consumers may 
be morally and practically permitted to purchase goods 
from sweatshops because that is the best outcome they can 
bring about. So, to put it a bit simplistically, one possible 
upshot of hybridism is that, morally speaking, the exploita-
tion arguments track employers’ moral obligations, while the 
non-worseness arguments (at least sometimes) track what 
employers ought morally to do in a practical sense. Finally, 
the Reasonable View tracks the employers’ practical moral 
ought, and consumers’ moral and practical obligations.
Now that we have provided a general overview of what 
is to come, we are in a position to get to the more detailed 
defense of our position. Single obligation hybridism may be 
formulated more precisely as follows.37
Single Obligation Hybridism (SOH)
 (I) Possibilist Moral Obligation: At t an agent S has a 
possibilist moral obligation to φ at t’ iff φ-ing at t’ 
is part of the best series of acts that S can perform 
from t to the last moment that S can possibly per-
form an act.
 (II) Actualist Practical Moral Ought: At t an agent S 
has most practical moral reason to φ at t’ iff φ-ing 
at t’ is under S’s control at t and φ-ing at t’ is either 
(i) identical to the maximally specific possibilist 
obligation that S has at t, (ii) a rationally permis-
sible supererogatory act, or (iii) is the least ration-
ally impermissible, all things considered, act-set 
presently under S’s control at t. There is an act-set 
that satisfies (iii) iff no act-set presently under S’s 
control at t satisfies conditions (i) or (ii).
While this definition of SOH is rather technical, the basic 
idea is quite simple, and can be illustrated by considering its 
applications in Entrepreneurial Eddie. As in the original ver-
sion of the case, suppose that the act-sets Eddie can perform 
are ranked from best to worst as follows.
X – <Pay his workers a high wage and keep the factory 
open as long as it’s profitable>.
Y – <Pay his workers a low wage and keep the factory 
open as long as it’s profitable>.
Z – <Pay his workers a high wage and close the fac-
tory after 6 months>.
Suppose, again, that if Eddie were to freely decide to 
<pay his workers a high wage> he would later freely decide 
to <close the factory after 6 months> no matter what he 
intends to do at the time he decides to <pay his workers a 
high wage>.
In this case, hybridism entails that Eddie has a possi-
bilist moral obligation to <pay his workers a high wage> 
and also to <keep the factory open as long as it’s profit-
able>. This is because the possibilist obligation, which picks 
out the criterion of right, holds that agents are obligated to 
perform each act that is part of the best series of acts they 
can perform over the course of their lives. The possibilist 
obligation can also serve to ground reactive attitudes. On 
plausible accounts of blameworthiness, Eddie can be blame-
worthy to the extent he culpably fails to pay his employees 
the high wage. This feature of the view allows hybridism to 
be immune from the Not Demanding Enough Objection and 
from the Bad Behavior Objection. It can also capture what 
proponents of exploitation arguments want to capture. In 
paying his employees such a low wage, Eddie is wrongfully 
exploiting his employees and can be morally criticizable for 
doing so.
35 The terminology of a “moral practical ought” is a bit tricky, in 
part, because the phrase “practical ought” is used in different ways in 
the literature and, in part, because we are identifying a unique kind of 
moral practical ought. So, we want to take care to specify exactly how 
we are using the term. Both oughts in hybridism are moral oughts, 
and so both concern what an agent morally ought to do. The possi-
bilist ought tells the agent which action is morally required of them 
at the time(s) in question. The actualist ought tells the agent which 
action will, at the time(s) in question, result in the least amount of 
moral wrongdoing over the course of their lives. Since these are 
both moral oughts, they are in the same domain as one another, and 
in a different domain what whatever non-moral oughts there are. 
Hybridism takes no stance about how to weigh the oughts in various 
domains, or in the role that these moral oughts play in determining 
what one has most reason, all things considered, to do.
36 Hybridism has been defended at length in the literature. See Tim-
merman (2015), Timmerman and Cohen (2016), and Cohen and Tim-
merman (forthcoming).
37 We are using the term obligation narrowly as shorthand for moral 
obligation and the term ought broadly to refer to any claim about how 
one should act within any normative domain. So, a moral obligation 
is one type of moral ought, while a practical moral ought is another 
type of moral ought. We could also speak of what one prudentially 
ought to do, what one legally ought to do, and so on. This formula-
tion of SOH is a simplified version of the one given in Timmerman 
and Cohen (2016, pp. 682–683). The simpler version of SOH suffices 
for the purposes of this paper, however, since none of our arguments 
hinge on the issues addressed in the more complex definition.
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At the same time, hybridism is immune from the Worst 
Outcome Objection because only the actualist moral ought 
is action-guiding. The actualist practical moral ought pre-
scribes performing the act that would result in the best out-
come from among the set of acts presently under the agent’s 
control.38 Sometimes this is identical with the possibilist 
obligation and sometimes it isn’t. This practical moral ought 
then serves the purpose of minimizing wrongdoing in light 
of one’s moral shortcomings. One should act in accordance 
with this ought insofar as one should care about minimiz-
ing the amount of wrongdoing they freely perform over the 
course of their life.39 So, in Entrepreneurial Eddie, hybrid-
ism entails that Eddie practically morally ought to <pay his 
employees a low wage> because, of all the outcomes under 
his present control, <paying his employees a low wage> 
will bring about the best outcome. This is because, no mat-
ter what Eddie’s current intentions are, he will freely Z if 
he now <pays his employees a high wage> and freely Y if 
he now <pays his employees a low wage> .40 In essence, 
hybridism tells Eddie to perform a wrong act now (i.e. pay 
his employees a low wage) in order to prevent himself from 
performing an even worse act later (i.e. closing the factory 
after 6 months, leaving everyone destitute). Stated over sim-
plistically, hybridism tells people to act like actualists, even 
though they’re obligated to act like possibilists.
The actualist ought feature of hybridism captures what 
proponents of the Reasonable View want to capture in their 
arguments. It also captures something like what proponents 
of the non-worseness principle want to capture in their argu-
ments. That is, hybridism allows that in some sense it’s often 
(though not always) better for sweatshop employers to pay 
their employees a low wage than not to and, as such, third 
parties should not attempt to prevent sweatshops from com-
ing into existence. Furthermore, in line with both views, 
hybridism allows that consumers may permissibly purchase 
sweatshop goods.
To be sure, hybridism won’t capture everything that pro-
ponents of the Reasonable View and non-worseness princi-
ple want to capture, and not all real life considerations will 
map on to various actualist/possibilist cases. Contrary to the 
Reasonable View, hybridism entails that the thing to do for 
sweatshop employers is to create sweatshops. Even though 
this is morally wrong, the alternative to them creating sweat-
shops is sometimes even worse. Notice this means that the 
Reasonable View is subject to the Worst Outcome objection. 
This consideration makes us think that it’s the so-called Rea-
sonable View, and not hybridism, that is in need of amend-
ment. Contrary to defenders of the non-worseness principle, 
hybridism allows that it can be wrong for sweatshop employ-
ers to exploit their employees even though doing so can be 
the result of a voluntary, mutually beneficial transaction. 
At least, hybridism allows this given the ranking of out-
comes we’ve provided above. We believe these rankings are 
plausibly the correct ones for reasons given by defenders of 
exploitation arguments. As such, we think defenders of the 
non-worseness principle should slightly revise their view to 
be consistent with both hybridism and the ranking of out-
comes we’ve provided. However, we recognize that there is 
reasonable disagreement about the issue of how to rank the 
outcomes. This is not a problem for our argument, though, 
since hybridism can generate the verdicts in line with those 
defended by proponents of the non-worseness principle. To 
do this, one would simply need to provide a different rank-
ing of the outcomes, one where (Y ≥ X). We take this to be 
a feature, not a bug, of hybridism.
To sum up, hybridism captures what seems right about 
actualism and possibilism, while avoiding the problems that 
plague each view. This resolves the paradox of actualist/pos-
sibilist cases. It also supports what we take to be a plausible 
and heretofore overlooked view about the ethics of sweat-
shops. Specifically, hybridism allows that it’s permissible 
for consumers to purchase goods from sweatshops, imper-
missible for employers to run sweatshops, even though this 
may be what they have most practical moral reason to do, 
and impermissible for third parties to prevent the existence 
of sweatshops when, and because, preventing the existence 
of sweatshops would bring about an even worse outcome.
38 We are not claiming that this is the sense of ought that actualists 
had in mind when formulating their view. They were indeed referring 
to the ought of moral obligation. Rather, we are only claiming that 
there is (defeasible) reason to accept the two oughts of hybridism, as 
we’ve formulated it, over either actualism or possibilism. Accepting 
hybridism avoids the three problems we’ve identified for other views, 
while retaining the elements that seem plausible about both actualism 
and possibilism, or so we argue.
39 We wish to note that hybridism does not assume the truth or fal-
sity of moral rationalism, viz.—the view that if one is morally obli-
gated to φ, then they are rationally required to φ. If moral rationalism 
is true, and if one’s practical moral ought conflicts with the ought of 
moral obligation, then it follows that acting in accordance with one’s 
practical moral obligation will entail that one is doing something irra-
tional. At the same time, in cases with this structure, the true coun-
terfactuals of freedom will guarantee that acting in accordance with 
one’s moral obligation will also entail that one will eventually acts 
irrationally. They need not act irrationally, but the true counterfactu-
als of freedom entail that they will freely choose to do so at some 
point. One of us is sympathetic to such a view for reasons given in 
Timmerman and Swenson (2019, § VII), but hybridism explicitly 
remains neutral with respect to this question. It is consistent with 
views that do, and don’t, allow that doing what we morally ought to 
do can be irrational. We take this to be a feature, not a bug, of hybrid-
ism.
40 For very helpful written and verbal feedback on earlier versions 
of this paper, we would like to thank Daniel Palmer, Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord, Kenneth Silver, and participants at the 2019 Philosophy, 
Politics, and Economics conference.
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Conclusion
We have aimed to accomplish a few important goals with 
this paper. First, focusing on questions about the ethics of 
sweatshops, we brought to light the overlooked interde-
pendence between the actualism/possibilism debate and the 
business ethics literature. In doing so, we examined some 
seminal arguments in the sweatshop literature and drew out 
their implicit actualist or possibilist assumptions. Second, 
we reviewed the problems that plague both actualism and 
possibilism and, as a consequence, the problems inherited 
by the arguments in the sweatshop literature that implicitly 
assume either actualism or possibilism. Third, we proposed 
and made a prima facie case for an alternative view known 
as single obligation hybridism. This form of hybridism 
retains what seems right about actualism and possibilism, 
yet avoids the problems that plague each view and, in our 
estimation, supports an extremely plausible set of verdicts 
about the ethics of sweatshops.
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